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The Interaction Between Family
Attribution Rules and
Corporate Redemptions
Francis B. Brogan, Jr.*
The application ofstock attribution rules to corporate redemptionspresents some
dot~cult issues in corporate tax law. This Article analyzes two significant areas of
controversy-the relevance offamiy hostility in mitigating the application offamil,
attribution rules and the extension of the statutory waiver of attribution to estates.
The author advocates judicial inquiry in the above situations where the rationalefor
application of the attribution rules no longer exists. The Article concludes with pro-
posalsfor change in judicial and legislative response based on policy considerations.
INTRODUCTION
THE INTERPLAY of attribution rules of Internal RevenueCode' section 318 with corporate redemptions under section
302 is a troublesome area of corporate tax law. One area of con-
troversy is the relevance of family hostility in mitigating the con-
structive ownership rules of section 318 while determining
dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1). Another issue is
whether the statutory waiver of family attribution under section
302(c)(2) should be extended to estates.
The problem of family hostility has been brought to the fore-
front by the issuance of Revenue Ruling 80-262 in which the Serv-
ice reiterated its position that the family attribution rules of
section 318 must be mechanically applied in ascertaining dividend
equivalence under section 302(b)(1). This position is contrary to
the First Circuit decision in Haft Trust v. Commissioner3 which
allowed the attribution rules to be disregarded where the family
relationship had deteriorated.
* B.S.B.A. (1971), Georgetown University; J.D. (1974), LL.M. (1977), Georgetown
University Law Center. The author is a partner in the firm of English, McCaughan &
O'Bryan, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Hereinafter the Internal Revenue Code will be referred to as the "Code," the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue as the "Commissioner," and the Internal Revenue
Service as the "Service."
2. Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 67. See notes 111-13 infra and accompanying text.
3. 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'g andremanding, 61 T.C. 398 (1973), supplemented,
62 T.C. 145 (1974).
INTER.CTION
The issue of allowing estates to file a waiver of the entity attri-
bution rules of section 318(a)(3) has been presented in Rickey v.
United States.4 The court in Rickey allowed an estate to file a
waiver of the entity attribution rules of section 318(a)(3). Com-
mentators have been critical of this decision because such a waiver
is not provided for by section 302(c)(2).
Both the issues of the relevance of family hostility and the stat-
utory waiver of attribution by entities were raised in the recent
case of Metzger Trust.' This position supports the stance of Reve-
nue Ruling 80-26 and confficts with the decision of the First Cir-
cuit in Haft Trust. Additionally, the Tax Court refused to follow
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rickey-a case seemingly on
point--and rejected the taxpayer's attempted waiver of the attri-
bution rules of section 318(a)(3).7  The Tax Court's opinion
threatens further judicial development of family hostility and en-
tity waiver concepts. The policy rationales supporting family hos-
tility and entity waiver, however, merit affirmative action by
Congress.8
The purpose of this Article is to outline the relevant provisions
of the Code and regulations, to examine the legislative history of
these provisions, and to analyze the case law which has focused on
the application of attribution rules in corporate redemptions. The
established practice regarding waiver of these rules will then be
examined and proposals for changes will be explored and ana-
lyzed.
I. FAMILY ATTRIBUTION RULES AND SECTION 302 CORPORATE
REDEMPTIONS
A. Code Provisions and Regulations
A corporate redemption of stock may be characterized as ei-
ther an exchange or distribution. Section 302 provides a general
rule that if a corporation redeems its stock and one of the four
exceptions9 in section 302(b) applies, the redemption shall be
4. 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979). See notes 92-108 infra and accompanying text.
5. [1981] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 37,614. See notes 115-17 infra and accompany-
ing text.
6. After final decision is rendered in Mfetzger Trust, it is appealable to the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.
7. See notes 146-48 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 149-72 infra and accompanying text.
9. Only three of the four sections have general applicability. The fourth exception,
§ 302(b)(4), applies only to stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorganizations.
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treated as part or full payment in exchange for the stock.' 0 A re-
demption within section 302(b) is an acquisition by a corporation
of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property.It If the
corporate redemption of stock does not qualify under one of these
exceptions, section 301 applies and the redemption is treated as a
distribution of property.' 2 Under section 301(c), the distribution
is treated as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits, with
any excess over the dividend amount reducing the shareholder's
basis in the stock. Any amount in excess of basis would be enti-
tled to exchange treatment.
The benefits in qualifying for exchange treatment are enor-
mous. The shareholder's gain would be recognized under section
1001. If the stock is a capital asset' 3 in the hands of the share-
holder and has been held for the requisite one-year period,'4 the
gain would qualify for the sixty percent long term capital gains
deduction.' 5 Only the remaining forty percent would be subject to
taxation at normal income tax rates.' 6 Alternatively, dividend
treatment 7 requires full inclusion of the dividend amount into in-
come at marginal rates of up to seventy percent.'"
The first exception in section 302 is for a redemption "not es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend."' 9 The regulations under this
section state that the question of whether a distribution in re-
demption of a shareholder's stock is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.2"
The Code provides that in determining whether this test has been
met, the failure to satisfy the other exceptions of section 302 shall
not be taken into account.2'
The second exception is for a substantially disproportionate
10. I.R.C. § 302(a).
11. I.R.C. § 317(b). As a general rule, a corporation recognizes no gain or loss on a
distribution in redemption of its own stock; however, § 31 (d) mitigates this effect to some
extent.
12. I.R.C. § 302(d).
13. I.R.C. § 1221.
14. I.R.C. §§ 1222(3), 1223.
15. I.R.C. § 1202.
16. The highest marginal tax rate for capital gains income in most cases is 28% (100%
gain - 60% deduction x 70% highest marginal rate). However, the alternative minimum
tax of § 55 may raise this percentage in some cases.
17. I.R.C. § 3019(c). A dividend is defined by § 316(a) as a distribution of property
made by a corporation to its shareholders out of earnings and profits accumulated since
February 28, 1913, or out of earnings and profits for the current taxable year.
18. I.R.C. § 1.
19. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
21. I.R.C. § 302(b)(5).
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redemption of stock.2 2 To qualify for this exception, the following
conditions must be met: (1) the shareholder must own, immedi-
ately after the redemption, less than fifty percent of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote;' (2) the
shareholder's percentage ownership of -the outstanding voting
stock must be reduced immediately after the redemption to less
than eighty percent of the shareholder's percentage interest in the
stock immediately before the redemption;24 and (3) the share-
holder's percentage ownership of the outstanding common stock
(both voting and nonvoting) must be reduced immediately after
the redemption to less than eighty percent of the percentage own-
ership immediately before the redemption. 5
The third exception involves a complete redemption of all the
stock in the corporation that is owned by the shareholder. 6 This
section is the most useful from a practical standpoint and will be
examined in slightly more detail later in the Article.27
Section 302(c) makes the attribution rules of section 318 spe-
cifically applicable in determining ownership of stock for purposes
of section 302.28 In the context of family hostility, the effect of
section 302 in determining whether a redemption is essentially
equivalent to a dividend has been questioned. This effect is the
focal point of one of the issues discussed in detail in this Article.29
It is interesting to note at this point that the Treasury Regulations
state that the attribution rules are merely one factor to be consid-
ered in determining dividend equivalence.30
There is one statutory exception to the imposition of the attri-
bution rules in the context of corporate redemptions. Section
302(c)(2)(A) provides that in determining whether a complete ter-
mination of a shareholder's interest under section 302(b)(3) has
occurred, the family attribution rules of section 318(a)(1) shall not
apply if. (1) immediately after the distribution, the distributee
has no interest in the corporation other than an interest as a credi-
tor;31 (2) the distributee does not acquire any other interest within
22. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2).
23. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B).
24. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C).
25. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3).
27. See notes 118-21 infra and accompanying text.
28. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1).
29. See notes 64-113 & 155-65 infra and accompanying text.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.302.2(b) (1955).
31. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
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ten years of the date of distribution, other than by bequest or in-
heritance;32 and (3) the distributee files an agreement with the
Service agreeing to notify the Service upon acquiring any interest
prohibited by (2). 33
To prevent an abuse of the family attribution waiver rule,
Congress enacted section 302(c)(2)(B) which denies a waiver in
the following situations: first, where one family member has
transferred stock to another family member so the corporation can
later redeem all such stock from the transferee and second, where
one family member has transferred some stock to another family
member to qualify the redemption of the transferor's remaining
stock as a complete termination of interest. The Code accom-
plishes this goal by providing that the waiver rule will not apply if
any portion of the stock redeemed was acquired within a ten-year
period from a person whose ownership of the stock would have
been attributable to the redeeming stockholder under section
318(a).34 The waiver benefits are also denied if stock is held by
any other person whose ownership would be attributable to the
redeeming stockholder and was acquired from the redeeming
stockholder within the ten-year period prior to the date of the
transaction, unless that stock is also redeemed.35 There is, how-
ever, an escape hatch which allows the family attribution rules to
be waived, despite a stock transfer during the preceding ten
years, if the transfer did not have as one of its principal purposes
the avoidance of federal income tax.36
The attribution rules of section 318 which affect corporate re-
demptions are quite complex. An individual is considered to own
stock owned, directly or indirectly, by his or her spouse (absent a
legal separation), children, grandchildren and parents.37 Only
these family attribution rules can be waived in a complete termi-
nation of interest redemption.38 There are, however, other catego-
ries of attribution. For example, an individual is considered
constructively to own stock held by certain entities. Stock owned
32. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii).
33. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii).
34. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(i).
35. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(ii).
36. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B) (last paragraph). The Service has liberalized the require-
ments to obtain the benefits of this relief provision. See Rev. Rul. 77-293, 1977-2 C.B. 91;
Rev. Rul. 77-455, 1977-2 C.B. 93. See also Brogan, Rulings on Tax Motivated Transfers
Expand Planning Possibilities for Redemptions, 51 J. TAX. 292 (1979).
37. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A).
38. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A).
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by a partnership or estate is deemed to be owned proportionately
by the partners or beneficiaries of the entity.3 9 Stock owned by a
trust is considered to be owned by its beneficiaries in proportion to
the actuarial interest of the beneficiaries in the trust.4° Grantor
trusts, however, under sections 671-678 are deemed to have their
stock owned by the owner of the trust under these rules.4' Stock-
holders who hold fifty percent or more of a corporation's stock are
viewed as owners of their proportionate share, determined by the
value of their stock holdings as a percentage of all stock held by
the corporation.42
Conversely, stock owned by individuals is also attributable to
entities in which they have an interest. A partnership or estate is
considered to own stock owned by a partner or beneficiary. 3 A
trust is deemed to own stock owned by a beneficiary of the trust,
unless the beneficiary has a remotely contingent interest, com-
puted actuarially, of less than five percent." A corporation is
treated as owning all the stock owned by a person holding fifty
percent or more of the value of its stock.45
The overall complexity of the attribution rules is heightened
by the concept of re-attribution. It is in this area that many
taxpayers find they cannot meet the mechanical "safe harbor"
provisions of section 302 and consequently must fall back on the
"not essentially equivalent to a dividend" facts and circumstances
test.46 As a general rule, stock attributed to a person on the basis
of the provisions outlined above is deemed to be actually owned
by that person and may be re-attributed to another person.47 The
exceptions to this rule are limited. First, there can be no double
inclusion of stock owned by any person.48 Second, stock that is
39. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A).
40. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B)(i).
41. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B)(ii).
42. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C).
43. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(A).
44. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B).
45. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C). In addition, § 318(a)(4) provides that if a person has an
option to acquire stock, such stock shall be considered as owned by that person.
46. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
47. I.R.C. § 318(9)(5)(A).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-1(b)(2) (1968).
The operation of the rule prohibiting double inclusion can be demonstrated with the
following example.
Father (F) and Son (S) each have a 50% actuarial interest in a trust. The trust owns 100
shares of X Corp. directly. F also owns 100 shares of X Corp. directly. (Applying the
attribution rule of § 318(a)(2)(B), F would own 150 shares; 100 shares directly and 50
shares constructively through the trust). There are two possibilities for determining S's
holdings: (1) F's 100 shares could be attributed to S through the trust resulting in S own-
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considered to be owned by an individual because of the construc-
tive ownership rules is not treated as owned by that person for the
purposes of again applying the family attribution rules to make
another person the constructive owner of the stock.4 9  Finally,
stock owned constructively, but not actually, by a partnership,
trust, corporation, or estate shall not be considered as stock owned
by such entities for the purpose of applying the attribution rules
from those entities so as to make yet another entity the construc-
tive owner of the stock.50
ing 100 shares constructively; and (2) F's 100 shares could be attributed directly to S under
§ 318(a)(1)(A) in addition to 50 shares attributed to S through the trust. Thus, S would
own 150 shares constructively.
In applying the double inclusion rule, the stock owned by F may be used in the compu-
tation of S's holdings only once. Finally, F's stock must be attributed to S in the manner
that will maximize S's total stock ownership. Thus, F's holdings must be attributed directly
to S under § 318(a)(1)(A) and not through the trust under § 318(A)(2)(B).
49. I.R.C. § 318(9)(5)(B). This exception is not applicable if constructive ownership is
caused by the option attribution rules of § 318(9)(5)(D).
50. I.R.C. § 318(9)(5)(C).
The following examples illustrate the application of the attribution rules:
Example (a)
A, an individual, owns 50 percent of X Corporation's stock. The other 50
percent is owned by [an estate] in which A has a 20 percent interest. The [estate]
is considered as owning 100 percent of X, and A is considered as owning 60 per-
cent.
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 9.15 (4th ed. 1979).
A originally owned 50% of the total stock. A also owned a 20% residual interest in an
estate which owned the remaining 50%. Thus, A constructively owned I0% (20% of 50%) of
the estate's stock in addition to the original 50% interest. Therefore, A was considered to
own a total of 60%. Under § 318(a)(3)(A) the estate is considered to own all stock "owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for a . . . beneficiary of [the] estate." Therefore, the estate
owns 50% directly and 50% constructively for a total interest of 100%.
Example (b)
X Corporation's 100 shares of stock are owned as follows: 20 shares each by
A, B, and C, who are brothers, and 40 shares by a trust, in which the interests of
A, B, and C, computed actuarially, are 50 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent,
respectively. The trust is considered to own all of the stock in X, whereas A, B,
and C, in addition to the 20 shares each owns directly, own 20, 8, and 12 shares
constructively, respectively.
If C's interest in the trust was both "remote" (i.e., worth 5 percent or less) and
contingent, his stock would not be attributed to the trust, but its stock would be
attributed proportionately to him.
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 9.15 (4th ed. 1979).
Under § 318(a)(3)(B) all stock "owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a beneficiary of
[the] trust, . . . shall be considered as owned by the trust," unless the value of the benefici-
ary's interest, computed actuarially, is worth "5% or less of the value of the trust property."
A, B, and C each constructively own 50%, 20%, and 30% respectively of the trust's original




The "essentially equivalent" language contained in section
302(b)(1) first appeared in section 201(d) of the Revenue Act of
192151 which provided:
A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the dis-
tribution of any such dividend the corporation proceeds to can-
cel or redeem its stock at such time and in such manner as to
make the distribution and cancellation or redemption essen-
tially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the
amount received in redemption or cancellation of the stock
shall be treated as a taxable dividend .... 52
This legislation was a response to the Supreme Court decision in
Eisner v. Macomber,53 which held that pro rata stock distributions
represent a gain accruing to capital as opposed to a gain derived
from capital. As such, pro rata stock distributions do not consti-
tute taxable income within the meaning of the sixteenth amend-
ment. Section 201(d) was designed to combat taxpayers who, even
then, were attempting to have corporate earnings distributed at
capital gains rates. Several refinements to this provision were
made, and this concept was ultimately codified as section
115(g)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 54
Section 115(g)(1) was the sole statutory expression in the 1939
Code governing the qualification of a transaction as a redemption.
This language forced a factual determination in every case, result-
Brother A B C
(a) Individual Direct Holdings 20 shares 20 shares 20 shares
(b) Actuarial Interest in Trust 50% 20% 30%
(c) Trust's Original Holdings 40 shares 40 shares 40 shares
(d) Constructive Holdings
((b) x (c)) 20 shares 8 shares 12 shares
(e) Total Holdings
((a) + (d)) 40 shares 28 shares 32 shares
51. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 228 (amended and codified at I.R.C.
§ 115(g)(l) (1939)).
52. Id.
53. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
54. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, and Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
44 Stat. 9. Section 1 15(g)(l) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provides:
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was issued
as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution
and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the
distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or
cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings
or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable divi-
dend.
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ing in an examination of a variety of factors, such as whether
there was business purpose and whether the transaction was a tax
avoidance scheme, to determine if a redemption or dividend had
occurred. There was general disagreement among the courts as to
what types of factual determination met these guidelines." These
inconsistent decisions naturally created uncertainty, which pro-
vided the background for the legislative enactment of section 302
of the 1954 Code.56
The House report on the 1954 Code clearly indicates that these
changes were designed to implement specific conditions regarding
whether a redemption resulted in capital gains treatment. The
House bill was intended to eliminate the widespread confusion in
the area57 by enacting certain objective tests to determine the tax
consequences of stock dividends. 8 As a result, the revision of the
tax bill passed by the House contained no "essentially equivalent"
language.5 9 Rather, the House enactment only contained provi-
sions which were similar to those now contained in section
302(b)(2), (3), and (4). The Senate added section 302(b)(1) and
the current "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" language.
The Senate committee, in adding this language, took the position
that "the definite rules of the House bill appear unduly restrictive
... "6 The Senate report also indicates that it was following
existing law by inserting this language and it intended that a fac-
tual test apply.6'
55. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 309 (1970). In Davis the Court noted
that ambiguous wording of the policies embodied in § 115(g)(1) created much confusion in
the tax law. Justice Marshall stated that § 115(g)(1) was initially perceived to be aimed
only at tax avoidance schemes and thus courts sought to determine only if such a scheme
existed. Later the emphasis shifted to a consideration of the effect of the distribution.
Many courts held that if the distribution was motivated by a "sufficiently strong non-tax
business purpose," then it was deemed not to be essentially equivalent to a dividend. There
was a general disagreement, however, as to what would constitute a sufficiently strong non-
tax business purpose. The result was that courts proceeded on a case-by-case basis looking
to the particular facts involved in the transaction in question.
56. See id.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4025, 4060.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 309-10.
60. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4629, 4675.
61. Id. at 233-34, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4629, 4870. The
Senate report states:
In lieu of the approach in the House bill, your committee intends to revert in part
to existing law thereby making the determination of whether a redemption is tax-
able as a sale at capital gains rates or as a dividend at ordinary income rates
Vol. 31:304
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Neither report mentions the intended effect of the interplay of
the attribution rules with the provision added by the Senate. The
House report states that the Code "makes clear that the rules of
attribution of ownership provided in section 311 [now section 318]
will be applicable in determining ownership of stock for the pur-
pose of section 302."62 The House report further indicates an in-
tention to provide precise rules for attribution. The Senate
version, which was ultimately adopted, seems tacitly to accept the
House position that the attribution rules of section 318 will apply
to determinations of ownership for purposes of section 302(b)(l). 63
II. FAMILY HOSTILITY EXCEPTION TO APPLICATION OF
ATTRIBUTION RULES
The statutory and legislative framework discussed in the previ-
ous section provides conflicting authority concerning the interplay
of the corporate redemption and attribution rules where family
hostility is involved. These rules provide no definite guidelines on
whether there should be a family disharmony exception to the at-
tribution rules. On the one hand, the provisions of section 302
apply the attribution rules without mitigation.' 4 On the other
hand, the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" language of the
Code and the legislative history of section 302 require a factual
determination.6"
The Tax Court first recognized this controversy in Estate of
Squier v. Commissioner.66 This proceeding involved a redemption
from an estate where family disharmony existed regarding who
should be the president of the corporation. The Tax Court recog-
nized a "sharp cleavage" between the executor and members of
the Squier family.67 This fact, coupled with the existence of a sub-
stantial nonfamily minority interest and the court's finding of a
significant change in control, led the court to conclude that the
redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. This re-
dependent, except where it is specifically provided otherwise, upon a factual in-
quiry.
62. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 57, at A75 reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4025, 4212.
63. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60, at 43 reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4629, 4674-75.
64. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1). See notes 28-50 supra and accompanying text.
65. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) and S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60, at 233-34 reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4629, 4870.
66. 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq., 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted,
1978-2 C.B. 5.
67. Id. at 955.
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sult was reached despite the court's apparent application of the
attribution rules, which resulted in the taxpayer owning eighty
percent of the corporation's stock, both before and after the re-
demption.68
In 1961, the Tax Court decided another case that contained the
family disharmony issue. In Parker v. Commissioner69 evidence
was presented of a history of family disputes over control of the
corporation involved. To resolve these problems, the father had
the corporation redeem a portion of his stock to give control of the
corporation to his son. The court held that this redemption was
not essentially equivalent to a dividend because of the significant
change in control.7" While not clearly stated in the opinion, the
court appears not to have considered the attribution rules because
of the family disharmony present.7 '
The following year, the First Circuit passed in dicta on the
family disharmony issue. 2 The court noted that while the attribu-
tion rules are generally applicable to redemptions, their imposi-
tion is not inflexible. The rules need not be applied if it is
demonstrated that discord exists in a family relationship which
would make attribution unwarranted.73 There appears to have
been no further case law development on this issue until the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis.7 4 While Davis
did not deal directly with the family disharmony issue, it unques-
tionably altered the law by which redemptions qualified as not
essentially equivalent to a dividend. Consequently, Davis has a
68. Id. at 956-57.
69. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1961).
70. Id. at 900-01.
7 I. ld. In holding the attribution rules inapplicable, the Tax Court cited two of its
earlier opinions: Lewis v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 71 (1960), and Estate of Squier v. Com-
missioner, 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
In Lewir the court applied the attribution rules of § 318. The Parker court dis-
tinguished Parker from that precedent: "In [Lewis], however, the findings are devoid of
any reference to controversy or adversity of interest among the various shareholder inter-
ests." 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 900.
The court explained how it had reached an opposite result in Squier, recognizing that in
Lewis "we did not consider [the attribution rules] to be conclusive in all events. ... Id.
Further, "the issue of essential equivalence to a dividend is to be resolved in the light of all
the facts and circumstances involved." Id. Therefore, the family disharmony present in
Parker, as in Squier, caused the court to disregard the attribution rules of § 318. Id. at
900-01.
72. Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
73. 298 F.2d 11, 116 n.7. The Bradbury court distinguished both Squier and Parker,
commenting, "Here the record is clear that complete harmony and community of purpose
existed between petitioner and her daughter and consequently section 318 applies." Id.
74. 397 U.S. 301, reh. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970).
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great, although perhaps not clear, effect on the family disharmony
exception.
The taxpayer in Davis, along with his wife and children,
owned all of the common stock of a corporation. To allow the
corporation to have sufficient working capital to obtain a loan
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the taxpayer
purchased $25,000 worth of the corporation's preferred stock. The
parties intended that this preferred stock be redeemed when the
loan was paid. When the load was repaid, the taxpayer claimed
that the transaction was a redemption not essentially equivalent to
a dividend and that he realized no gain from the transaction since
his tax basis in the preferred stock was equal to the amount he
received. The Commissioner viewed the transaction as a redemp-
tion essentially equivalent to, and thus taxable as, a dividend. Af-
ter paying the resulting deficiency, the taxpayer sued for a refund
and was successful in the district court75 and court of appeals.7 6
The two basic issues in Davis were whether the stock attribu-
tion rules of section 318(a) applied to stock redemptions under
section 302(b)(1)77 and whether the redemption qualified as not
essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1). 78 In
considering the first issue, the Supreme Court looked to the "plain
language of the statute" to reject the taxpayer's argument that the
attribution rules did not apply to section 302(b)(1) redemptions.79
In support of its position, the Court also pointed to the views of
the courts of appeals which had considered the issue, 0 the opin-
75. Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967). The district court
held that the preferred stock was issued "solely in order to provide the additional security
required by the RFC as a precondition to making the initial $95,000 loan." Id. at 471.
Consequently, the amount received by Davis in exchange for his 1,000 shares of preferred
stock was not essentially equivalent to a dividend, but was treated as a distribution in
payment for the stock redeemed. Id.
76. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969). In affirming the district
court, the Sixth Circuit commented, "Although closely-held corporations call for close
scrutiny under the tax law, we will not, under the facts and circumstances of this case, allow
mechanical attribution rules to transform a legitimate corporate transaction into a tax
avoidance scheme." Id. at 1143-44. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the amount received
by Davis was not essentially equivalent to a dividend because the redemption was the final
step in a course of action that had a legitimate business (as opposed to a tax avoidance)
purpose. Id.
77. 397 U.S. at 304.
78. Id. at 307.
79. Id. at 306.
80. Id. at 306. See Levin v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 521,526-27 (2d Cir. 1967); Com-
missioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 342 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. United States, 301
F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962); Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116-17 (Ist Cir.
1962).
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ions of leading commentators,8' and the legislative history of the
attribution and redemption rules. 2 The Court clearly concluded
that the attribution rules did apply to redemptions under section
302(b)(l). 83 The Court then went on to decide the second issue
against the taxpayer.14 In so doing, the Court rejected any busi-
ness purpose exception to the essentially equivalent to a dividend
rules. The Court held that the motivation for the redemption was
to be disregarded in determining dividend equivalence. Thus, for
a redemption to qualify under section 302(b)(1), "a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's propor-
tionate interest in the corporation."85
The effects of Davis on the family disharmony exception to the
attribution rules were unclear following the decision and continue
to be so. While the Court did not cite Squier or specifically over-
rule it, some commentators argued that its findings seemed to un-
dercut the rationale for that decision.8 6  Other commentators,
however, argued that the family disharmony exception still ex-
isted.87 The Service in several post-Davis revenue rulings opined
that the attribution rules fully applied in testing redemptions
under section 302(b)(l), 88 indicating a determination that the fam-
81. 397 U.S. at 306. See Treas. Reg. 1.302-2(b); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 292 n.32 (2d ed. 1966).
82. 397 U.S. at 306-07. See notes 80-81 supra.
83. Id. at 307.
84. Id. at 307-13.
85. Id. at 313. The Court did not elaborate on what would constitute a meaningful
reduction, but held that Davis clearly (after application of the attribution rules) "was the
sole shareholder of the corporation both before and after the redemption," and therefore,
did not qualify under this test. Id.
86. See, e.g., 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 188, 192 n.38 (1970).
87. See, e.g., B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 9.24 at 26 n.43 (3d ed. 1971); D. KAHN, BASIC CORPORATE
TAXATION 32-33 n.80 (1973); Cathcart, Section 302 Redemptions: Family Fights and Attri-
bution, 61 A.B.A.J. 1272 (1975); Sweenes, "Not Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend"Excep-
tion Still Viable Despite Davis, 41 J. TAX. 78, 82 (1974); Comment, Defining Dividend
Equivalency Under Section 302(b)(1), 16 VILL. L. REV. 88 (1970).
88. Rev. Rul. 77-218, 1977-2 C.B. 81; Rev. Rul. 75-512, 1975-2 C.B. 112.
The facts in Rev. Rul. 77-218 involve two corporations (X and Y) in which W as the
beneficiary of a trust in each corporation directly owns 20% of the stock of X and 10% of
the stock of Y. Application of the attribution rules increases W's shares by constructive
ownership to 60% of X and 75% of Y. Similarly, by virtue of attribution, the trust is
deemed owner of the same percentage of shares. Y then acquires the trust-owned stock of
X for cash. The transaction qualifies as a redemption of the stock of Y since the trust was
in control of both the issuing corporation (X) and the acquiring corporation (Y)
(§ 304(a)(1)). Applying § 318(a)(2)(C), the trust owns 55% of X after the transaction and
fails to come under §§ 302(b)(2) and 302(b)(3). The Service concludes that the redemption
also fails to meet the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test under § 302(b)(1) since
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ily hostility exception was no longer cognizable. The courts did
not directly address this issue, although some glimmer of support
for the continued vitality of the Squier concept was found by the
Ninth Circuit. In Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. United States,
8 9
the court noted that assumptions of family harmony inherent in
the attribution rules "may prove indeed, awkward or unfair in
cases where families do not behave as the rules assume they will,
and intra-family disputes exist as to who should control and
how." 90 This observation was dicta, however, because there was
no evidence of family hostility before the court.91 The stage was
thus set for a definite holding on this topic, and the case of Haft
Trust v. Commissioner92 provided the perfect vehicle for this de-
termination.
In Haft Trust certain redemptions of stock owned by four
trusts in Haft-Gaines Company were involved. The trusts had
been created by Marcia Haft's father for her four children, two
from her marriage to Burt Haft and two from her previous mar-
riage who were adopted by Burt Haft. These trusts were estab-
lished in January 1962, and each held 25,000 shares of stock in the
company. In November 1966, Marcia Haft commenced divorce
proceedings against Burt Haft and each made "serious and bitter
charges and countercharges against the other."93 A series of nego-
tiations ensued between the parties and their representatives.
These negotiations culminated in a redemption in June 1967 of all
of the stock held by the trusts and the subsequent divorce of the
it does not constitute a "meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in
the corporation" (60% to 55% as required by Davis). Consequently, under § 302(d), the
redemption is regarded as a distribution of property to which § 301 applies.
In Rev. Rul. 75-512, the Service applied the attribution rules to find a redemption not
essentially equivalent to a dividend within § 302(b)(1). A family corporation redeemed 75
trust-owned shares from its 1,000 outstanding shares of common stock. After the redemp-
tion, the trust still owned 225 shares of 24.3% of the total stock through attribution. How-
ever, the percentage of stock owned by the trust after the redemption was 81% of the stock
owned prior to the redemption. Although the redemption did not qualify for exchange
treatment under §§ 302(b)(2) or 302(b)(3), the Service concluded that there was a meaning-
ful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation under Davis.
Factors considered were the trust's status as a minority shareholder taking no part in the
management of the corporation, a reduction of voting rights, the reduction of the right to
participate in current earnings and accumulated surplus and the reduced right to share in
net assets on liquidation.
89. 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
90. Id. at 465, nA.
91. Id. at 462.
92. 510 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1975).
93. Id. at 45.
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Hafts.94
Immediately prior to the redemption, the company had
500,000 shares of stock outstanding, which was owned as follows:
Shareholders
Burt Haft
Richard Haft (Burt's brother)
Jack Gaines
Abraham Haft Trust for the benefit of Burt Haft,
Richard Haft and Norma Gaines (Burt's sister)
Robin Haft Trust
Wendy Laura Haft Trust
Lisa Ann Haft Trust












After the redemption only 400,000 shares remained outstanding.
The issue before the court was "the relevance after United
States v. Davis of family hostility in mitigation of the constructive
ownership rules of Code section 318 in determining dividend
equivalence under section 302(b)(1)." 9 6 It should be noted that
because of the application of the attribution rules, the four trusts
were considered to own a greater percentage of stock in the corpo-
ration after the redemption than before it. This fact is demon-
strated by the following table:






























95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. at 44-45.
97. Id. at 46, n.2.
98. See I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(2)(B)(ii), (1)(A)(ii).
99. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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It was clear that if the attribution rules were applied as the sole
guideline in this case, the redemption would be considered as es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend under the Davis rationale.1l°
Initially, the First Circuit considered the principle from Squier
that family discord could call into question the community of in-
terest rationale of the attribution rules and therefore was a rele-
vant circumstance to be considered in determining dividend
equivalence under section 302(b)(1). Wl The court noted its en-
dorsement of this principle in Bradbury v. Commissioner,10 2 and in
the Tax Court's opinion below which reasoned that Squier had
been implicitly overruled by Davis.
°3
According to the First Circuit, Davis held that the attribution
rules must be taken into account in analyzing dividend equiva-
lence under section 302(b)(1), but are not determinative of
whether a redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend. 1°4
The court adopted the position that Davis permitted, if not man-
dated, an examination of the facts and circumstances of a particu-
lar situation to determine the effect of the transaction, rather than
a mere mechanical application of the attribution rules.'" 5
In support of its findings, the Court pointed to the Service's
regulations which provided that the issue is to be decided by ex-
amining the facts and circumstances of each case and that con-
structive stock ownership under section 318(a) is merely one of the
facts to be considered.'0 6 The court also concluded, on the basis
of Davis, that the effect of the transaction, rather than its motiva-
tion, is determinative.0 7
Thus, for the first time under the 1954 Code, a court held that
the family attribution rules of section 318(a)(1) could be disre-
garded or minimized under section 302(b)(1), depending on the
facts of the particular situation. The First Circuit remanded Haft
Trust to the Tax Court to consider the effect of family discord in
this particular situation. There was no further Tax Court opinion
on this issue, however, since the case was subsequently settled.108
100. Id. at 46.
101. 510 F.2d at 46.
102. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Bradbury.
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 48.
106. Id. at 47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
107. 510 F.2d at 48.
108. See Note, Family Hostility as a Factor in Determining Constructive Stock Owner-
ship in Corporate Redemptions, 29 TAx LAW. 386, 392 (1976).
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As a result, no case directly holds that the attribution rules should
be mitigated by family hostility. Issues such as how significant the
family dispute must be, who must be affected by it, and what facts
are needed to prove the disharmony are left open for discussion in
future cases. In this regard, the facts of Haft Trust indicate a dis-
pute between Mr. and Mrs. Haft rather than any dispute between
the trustees of the four trusts and family members as officers of the
corporation. Consideration of these issues also awaits further case
law development.
The commentators on Haft Trust have been mostly favorable
in their review of the court's decision and the legal status of family
hostility with respect to section 318(a)(1). 109 Commentators gen-
erally agreed with the court's interpretation of Davis that the attri-
bution rules were merely one factor to be considered in
determining dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1). Other
factors, such as family disharmony, may be considered in reaching
this determination, and these additional factors may overcome the
effects of the constructive ownership. This position is supported
by Davis, which fully applied the attribution rules, but also devel-
oped a separate guideline for testing dividend equivalence. The
consideration of whether there was a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's interest would have been unnecessary if the attribu-
tion rules were determinative. The policy implications involved in
acknowledging factors that might mitigate the attribution rules
will be discussed in greater detail in the last section of this Arti-
cle.'' 0
The Service has recently issued Revenue Ruling 80-26" di-
rectly related to the family hostility issue. This ruling involved a
factual situation exactly like that of Haft Trust. The Service held
that the attribution rules are applicable in determining whether a
distribution in redemption qualifies under section 302(a). In so
doing, the Service announced it would follow neither the Haft
Trust decision nor the Squier decision.' 12
In Revenue Ruling 80-26, a corporation, whose outstanding
stock was owned by three individuals and five trusts, redeemed
109. See, e.g., Bacon, Corporate Stock Redemptions-Dfnitions; Basic Categories, 343
TAX MNOM'T (BNA) (1978); Englebredht & deCelles, Family Discord and Section 302
Stock Redemptions: A Review and Analysis, 58 TAXES 43 (1980); Note, supra note 108;
Note, Family Hostility as Mitigating the Constructive Ownership ofSection 318 When Applied
to the Dividend Equivalency Provision oSection 302(b)(1), 55 B.U.L. REV. 667 (1975).
110. See notes 155-65 infra and accompanying text.




the stock held by four of the trusts, which had been established for
the benefit of an individual shareholder's children. Before the re-
demption each trust owned, actually and constructively, thirty-one
percent of the stock. Afterwards each owned thirty-three percent
solely by attribution under section 318. Because of family hostil-
ity over a bitter divorce, the four trusts were prevented from exer-
cising actual control over the stock attributed to them.
Notwithstanding the family hostility, section 318 was applied and
the redemption was deemed not to qualify under section
302(b)(1). The Service based its decision on an analysis of Davis
and the legislative history of section 318.
The Service interpreted Davis to mean that in determining
dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1), the section 318 at-
tribution rules were directly applicable. The Service found that
"the purpose of the attribution rules under section 318 was to re-
place the confusion of prior law [pre-1954 Code] with clear and
objective standards for attribution of stock ownership among re-
lated shareholders."' 13
According to the Service, "the facts and circumstances of a
particular case cannot contradict the mechanical determination
under section 318 of how much stock a shareholder owns."' 14 The
Service expressly rejected the holdings in Haft Trust and Squier
on the grounds that the clearly defined rules of section 318 should
not be ignored, since the result would be an ad hoc utilization of
the family attribution rules.
In January of 1981, the Tax Court restated its position that
family hostility does not mitigate the application of family attribu-
tion rules. The opinion in Metzger Trust v. Commissioner 11 is a
major setback in the judicial development of a family hostility ex-
ception to the application of section 318.
In Metzger Trust, David Metzger formed Metzger Dairies, Inc.
(MDI) to operate a private dairy business. Earlier he had created
a trust with his wife, Nora, as life income beneficiary and his three
children, Jacob, Catherine, and Cecelia, each as one-third holders
of remainder interests. The trust then became a shareholder of the
MDI corporation. When David Metzger died, his son Jacob as-
sumed managerial control over MDI. His sisters, Catherine and
Cecelia, were installed as directors of the corporation.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. [1981] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 37, 614.
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For a while, the corporation operated profitably. As MDI's
performance and earnings fell, however, disagreements arose
among Jacob and his sisters over the proper management of MDI.
Over the next few years, numerous personal battles and general
family discord bred deep-seated animosities between Jacob and
his two sisters. Eventually as a result of this family hostility, Ja-
cob and his sisters decided to cause MDI to redeem the stock
owned by the trust and the two sisters so that Jacob would acquire
full control over MDI. In return, Jacob relinquished his interests
in the other family businesses in favor of his two sisters.
The primary issue which the Tax Court faced in Metzger Trust
was whether family hostility nullified the attribution rules under
section 318 so as to entitle the trust to exchange treatment under
section 302.116 The trust, relying on Haft Trust, argued that the
existence of family hostility should be a factor considered in miti-
gating the constructive ownership rules of section 318. The Tax
Court, however, specifically rejected the Haft Trust rationale and
concluded that family hostility would not mitigate the operation
of the constructive ownership rules in this case.' 7
Clearly, if the decision stands, Metzger Trust represents a dis-
ruption in the judicial development of a family hostility exception
to the section 318 constructive ownership rules. However, only
further judicial examination of the constructive ownership rules
and family hostility will reveal the significance of Metzger Trust.
III. STATUTORY WAIVER OF FAMILY ATTRIBUTION RULES
There is one statutory exception to the application of the attri-
bution rules in a corporate redemption. This exclusion can pro-
vide significant benefits in family hostility situations, and a recent
case law expansion' 8 of the scope of this statutory waiver could
further enhance its effectiveness.
A. Waiver by Individuals
Section 302(b)(3) provides that a redemption that completely
terminates a shareholder's interest in the redeeming corporation is
eligible for the more favorable exchange treatment. The attribu-
tion rules of section 318, however, are specifically made applicable
by section 302(c)(1) in determining whether the shareholder's in-
116. Id. at 2637.
117. Id. at 2647.
118. See notes 124-43 infra and accompanying text.
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terest has been completely terminated. As noted previously, a
waiver of the family attribution rules of section 318(a)(1) is pro-
vided in section 302(c)(2) where: 1) distributee actually termi-
nates stock ownership and has no interest in the corporation other
than as a creditor; 2) distributee does not acquire any such inter-
est (other than acquired by bequest or inheritance) within a ten-
year period; and 3) distributee files an agreement to notify the
Service of any such acquisition. This statutory waiver, however, is
inapplicable in two situations. First, the waiver of attribution is
not allowed if any portion of the stock redeemed was acquired
within a ten-year period from a person whose ownership of the
stock would be attributable to the redeeming stockholder under
section 318(a). Second, the statutory waiver may not be claimed if
any person owns stock which would be attributable to the redeem-
ing stockholder and which was acquired from such stockholder
within the ten-year period prior to the date of the transaction, un-
less that stock is also redeemed. These two exceptions to the statu-
tory waiver may be avoided if the prohibited transfer did not have
as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income
tax.'1 9 If the requirements for waiver can be met, then a family
dispute can be settled by the redemption of a family member's
stock. Where all of the stockholders are individuals, this settle-
ment does not prove to be very difficult.
B. Waiver by Entities
Where one or more of the stockholders are entities, statutory
waiver of the family attribution rules may be difficult to achieve.
In Haft Trust, the trustee attempted to avail the trusts of the bene-
fits of the complete termination of interest redemption under sec-
tion 302(b)(3). The attempt was made by filing the agreement
required by section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii),' 20 thereby waiving the family
attribution rules. Both the Tax Court and the First Circuit held
that the agreement was not filed in a timely fashion, and therefore
did not consider the merits of whether a trust could obtain statu-
tory waiver of family attribution rules.' 2'
The Service maintained that section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) does not
allow an entity to obtain statutory waiver of the family attribution
119. See § 302(c)(2)(B) and the prior discussion of this issue at notes 28-56 supra and
accompanying text.
120. This agreement is hereinafter referred to as "triple eye" (iii) agreement.
121. 62 T.C. 145 (1974) (supplemental opinion); 510 F.2d 43, 45 n.1 (1st Cir. 1975).
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rules. In Revenue Ruling 59-233, 122 the Service found that a trust
could not avail itself of the waiver privilege. It argued that an
examination of the legislative history of section 302(c)(2)(A)
clearly revealed that only individuals could qualify to file a waiver
agreement. This position was reiterated concerning estates in
Revenue Ruling 68-388.123 At the same time, the Service stated
that it would not recognize a transfer from entity to individual
beneficiaries to facilitate the waiver of the attribution rules.
In Crawford v. Commissioner124 the Tax Court rejected the
Service's interpretation of the word "distributee" to mean individ-
uals and not entities. The only shareholders of the corporation
were the decedent's estate, his surviving spouse, and' his two
sons.'25 The sole beneficiary of the estate was the mother of the
sons.' 26 The mother constructively owned all the stock owned by
her sons, through operation of section 318(a)(1)(A). The estate,
both before and after the redemptions, constructively owned all of
the stock that was actually and constructively owned by the
mother, through operation of section 318(a)(3)(A). Both the
mother and the estate filed "triple eye" agreements.' 27 The Serv-
ice claimed that the estate could not waive the series of attribu-
tions under sections 318(a)(1) and 318(a)(3) from the sons, to the
mother, to the estate. Relying on the legislative history of section
302(c)(2), the Service argued that the family attribution rules
could be waived only by individuals. 128 The court, however, dis-
agreed and noted that congressional use of the term "distributee"
rather than individual avoided any limitation of the attribution
rules to individuals. 129
The second argument made by the Service was that waiver of
the attribution rules by the estate would not bind the beneficiaries
and, therefore, would not prevent them from reacquiring an inter-
est in the corporation within the succeeding ten-year period.
While the court acknowledged this potential for abuse, it noted
that the particular remedy proposed by the Service would lead to
a nonsensical result. Since the statutory waiver applies only to the
family attribution rules, the Service's concern appears unfounded.
122. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106.
123. Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 C.B. 122.
124. 59 T.C. 830 (1972), nonacq. 1974-2 C.B. 5.
125. 59 T.C. at 833.
126. Id. at 832.
127. Id. at 833.
128. Id. at 835.
129. Id. at 835-37.
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Any reacquisition by the beneficiary would constitute a prohibited
reacquisition by the entity under the entity attribution rules and
thus defeat the effectiveness of the waiver. In Revenue Ruling
71-562, t3o the Service implicitly recognized this point. This ruling
held that a reacquisition by a member of the redeeming stock-
holder's family would not violate the ten-year acquisition rule.' 3'
The Crawford rationale was extended to trusts in Johnson
Trust v. Commissioner. 31 In Johnson Trust, a testamentary trust
owned roughly five percent of the corporation's stock. 33 The pri-
mary beneficiary of the trust was the decedent's son, who individ-
ually owned no stock in the corporation. 134 His mother, whose
actuarial interest in the trust was not sufficient to require attribu-
tion to the trust under section 318(a)(3)(B)(i), owned approxi-
mately forty percent of the stock in her own name. 135 Under
sections 318(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii) her stock was attributable
through her son to the trust. The Tax Court rejected the Service's
attempts to limit the use of "triple eye" agreements to individuals
and to limit the Crawford decision to situations where the benefi-
ciary also filed a "triple eye" agreement. 136 The court also noted
that if the son acquired stock in the corporation, this would be
attributed to the trust under section 318(a)(3)(B)(i) and thus defeat
the trust's waiver. 13
7
The Johnson Trust and Crawford decisions were further ex-
tended by Rickey v. Commissioner. 38 This decision involved a
corporation whose stock was owned fifty-seven percent by an es-
tate and thirty-five percent by the decedent's two sons and daugh-
ter. The remaining eight percent was owned by other
shareholders unrelated to the decedent's family. The will of the
decedent left all of his property to his children. The estate's shares
130. Rev. Rul. 71-562, 1971-2 C.B. 173. For a discussion of this issue, see Willens,
Recent Decisions Open the Wayfor Trusts and Estates to Waive Stock Attribution, 51 J.
TAx. 208 (1979).
131. The ruling held that an acquisition by A's son is not an acquisition of an interest
by A [father] within the meaning of§ 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). Therefore, any interest in the corpo-
ration acquired during the 10-year period following redemption of A's stock, which would
be attributable to A solely by reason of family attribution rules, would be disregarded for
purposes of § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). Rev. Rul. 71-562, 1971-2 C.B. 173, 174.
132. 71 T.C. 941 (1979).
133. Id. at 943.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 943.
136. Id. at 950.
137. Id. at 948.
138. 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
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were redeemed, pursuant to a buy-sell agreement. The shares of
the children, however, were not redeemed.' 39 This fact pattern is
substantially different from those in Johnson Trust and Crawford
since beneficiaries of the redeeming entity remained shareholders
of the corporation. The entity attribution rules of section
318(a)(3)(A) dictate that the stock owned by the decedent's chil-
dren, as beneficiaries of his estate, would be considered as owned
by the estate. The filing of the "triple eye" agreement would not
effectively waive this attribution since that agreement is applicable
only to the waiver of family attribution under section 318(a)(1).
After the redemption, the estate would be considered to own
shares in the corporation and would not have completely termi-
nated its interest in the corporation.
Recognizing this situation, the court in Rickey attempted to
apply the principles of Squier and Haft Trust to its facts,' 40 even
though no family disharmony was present. The Fifth Circuit
joined those courts in rejecting "a crabbed reading of the Code
when the rationale for applying a rule is absent, and where appli-
cation of the rule leads to inappropriately harsh results."'' The
court noted that the estate's actual interest in the corporation had
terminated, and that the decedent's death could not be viewed as a
"device to bleed out corporate profits at capital gains rates."' 42
Although not provided for in the statute, the court allowed the
estate to file a waiver of the entity attribution rules of section
318(a)(3).' 43
Commentators have been critical of the result reached in the
Rickey case.144 Their comments have been primarily directed to
the decision allowing the estate to file a waiver of the entity attri-
bution rules, a result clearly not provided for by section 302(c)(2).
Limited to that narrow ground, this criticism is well taken; the
court's reliance on the statutory waiver was misguided. To the
extent Rickey rested on the principles enunciated in Squier and
Haft Trust, however, it was a logical extension of the concept that
139. Id. at 1255.
140. Id. at 1257.
141. Id. at 1258.
142. Id.
143. The Rickey court held that this transaction also qualified as not essentially
equivalent to a dividend under § 302(b)(I). See 592 F.2d 1251, 1258 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979).
Since the Rickey family actually owned over 80% of the corporation's stock both before
and after the redemption, it is questionable whether a meaningful reduction in ownership
occurred. See Rev. Rul. 78-401, 1978-2 C.B. 127.
144. See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 92; Willens, supra note 130.
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the obseqious application of the attribution rules is improper
where, under the facts of a particular case, a mechanical applica-
tion of this rule would result in a harsh and unjustified decision.
Rickey can thus be read as part of a growing judicial trend to
examine the congressional intent in enacting the attribution rules
and to disregard these rules where the rationale for their existence
is not present in a particular case. Rickey also applies to a section
302(b)(3) redemption and the principles expressed in Haft Trust
for section 302(b)(1) redemptions. It is unclear whether the Rick-
ey result is limited solely to shareholders that are estates or
whether individuals can also benefit from it. The rationale under-
lying the decision, however, seems to limit its application to es-
tates.
The Service has provided taxpayers a method of avoiding the
entity waiver issue in factual circumstances similar to those found
in Crawford. In Revenue Ruling 79-67,145 the Service retreated
from its position in Revenue Ruling 68-388 and held that an es-
tate could transfer stock in a corporation to its beneficiary and
then have the corporation redeem the stock held by the benefici-
ary where the stock received from the estate is the only stock held
by the beneficiary. The Service reiterated its position in Crawford
and Revenue Ruling 68-388 that the estate could not waive the
attribution rules. It noted, however, that the beneficiary could file
the "triple eye" agreement. The ruling pointed out that the distri-
bution from the estate to the beneficiary would be covered by the
ten-year prior acquisition rules of section 302(c)(2)(B). Yet, it also
indicated that the avoidance of federal income tax was not one of
the principal purposes of the distribution from the estate and,
therefore, the exception to the prior acquisition rules had been
met.
Revenue Ruling 79-67 appears to be a logical solution to the
entity waiver problem. The finding of no tax avoidance motive in
the distribution from the estate is of particular importance. The
position of this revenue ruling could also be extended to trusts, but
probably would be limited only to those situations where the dis-
tributions from the trust are mandated by the trust instrument.
Discretionary distributions would probably be suspect under the
tax avoidance test. This rfuling probably provides no help in a
Rickey-type fact pattern, where the beneficiaries of the estate also
continue as stockholders in their own right after the redemption.
145. Rev. Rul. 79-67, 1979-1 C.B. 128.
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The revenue ruling highlights the effect of the ten-year acquisi-
tion rules of section 302(c)(2)(B), which should also be applied to
acquisitions by estates and trusts. The transfer of stock to an es-
tate can hardly be considered a tax avoidance maneuver. An ac-
quisition has greater significance in a trust situation, however, and
will in many cases prevent the filing of the "triple eye" agreement.
It can be legitimately argued that if an entity can satisfy the statu-
tory rules, it should be allowed to waive the family attribution
requirements. Congress has provided a statutory mechanism in
section 302(c)(2) for testing tax avoidance in this situation; if these
guidelines are met, no legitimate grounds exist for denying waiver
treatment. The two Service contentions in this area-that there
should be individual waiver only and that the potential for abuse
is inherent in entity waivers-are adequately answered by the
Code language. Thus, in the Crawford and Johnson Trust factual
situations, no reason exists to deny waiver benefits.
It should be noted that a recent decision by the Tax Court in
Metzger Trust'46 has again attacked the rationale and holding of
Rickey. In Metzger Trust, the trust argued that the agreement it
filed under section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) was effective to waive the
trust-beneficiary attribution rules of section 318(a)(3). In support
of its position the trust relied upon Rickey. The Tax Court discus-
sed Rickey at length, but after exploring its rationale, stated that it
disagreed with the court's reasoning. 4 7 The Tax Court then pro-
ceeded to distinguish Rickey on the facts stating that Rickey in-
volved a redemption that was required by the decedent's will,
while in the instant case the redemption was effectuated solely to
avoid further family discord in the operation of the family busi-
nesses. 48 On these grounds, the Tax Court found the agreement
filed by the trust ineffective to waive the attribution rules of sec-
tion 318(a)(3).
Thus, in view of Metzger Trust, the operation of a Rickey-type
waiver of attribution rules may occur less frequently. Neverthe-
less, Rickey continues to represent a possible method of waiving
family attribution under certain circumstances. The next section
of the Article examines the policy considerations underlying the
waiver of attribution rules in family hostility and Rickey-type fact
situations.
146. [1981] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 37, 614. See notes 114-16 supra and accompa-
nying text.
147. Id. at 2649.
148. Id. at 2651.
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGES IN CORPORATE
REDEMPTION RULES
The analysis presented above portrays the existing legal guide-
lines regarding the effect of family attribution rules on corporate
redemptions. The language of the Code appears to require the use
of the attribution rules, an interpretation supported by the Davis
decision.' 49 In addition, certain language of the legislative history
indicates an intention to apply the attribution rules completely to
this type of transaction.150 Other language in the same legislative
history, however, indicates that a facts and circumstances test is
the appropriate method for determining dividend equivalence.15,
This view has been accepted by the Service in its regulations, and
the courts have tended to support the reasoning.' 52
An analysis of the various authorities on this point has led this
commentator to suggest two changes to the redemption rules to
reflect more accurately current policy considerations and to pro-
vide for more effective administration of tax policy. First, a facts
and circumstances test should be adopted with regard to a "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" redemption under section
302(b)(1). This test would allow sufficient evidence of family hos-
tility to overcome the effects of the attribution rules of section 318.
Second, the existing statutory waiver of the family attribution
rules of section 302(c)(2) should be extended, in the case of estates,
to a waiver of all attribution rules. Current statutory rules, how-
ever, should be maintained for redemption by individuals or other
entities.
A. Facts and Circumstances Test for
Section 302(b)(1) Redemptions
The first recommended change would establish a facts and cir-
cumstances test for determining dividend equivalence under sec-
tion 302(b)(1). This proposed guideline would allow sufficient
evidence of family hostility to overcome the family ownership
provisions of the attribution rules. The rationale behind the attri-
bution rules is that certain relationships bespeak an economic
identity of interest and common control. The attribution rules are
based on the assumption that entities benefiting certain individu-
149. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
150. See note 51 supra.
151. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 65 & 105 supra and accompanying text.
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als will act in concert with these individuals and likewise that in-
dividuals will react similarly toward entities which they control or
from which they receive benefits. This recommended change is
based on the principle that if the reason for the existence of the
attribution rules is no longer present, then the attribution rules
should not be utilized as a mechanism to deny a tax treatment
which would otherwise be available. For example, if a father and
son have legitimate policy disputes which caused hostility between
them, a redemption under section 302 should be permitted even if
the ten-year prior transfers rule has not been met.
Haft Trust recognized that, notwithstanding Davis, common
sense and fairness dictate that the attribution rules should not be
strictly applied where family disharmony exists. Haft Trust also
recognized the potential for abuse through family disputes spe-
cially manufactured in an attempt to remove corporate earnings at
capital gains rates.'53 The First Circuit indicated in Haft Trust
that courts should view such claims skeptically and require strong
evidence of the existence and nature of the dispute.'54 Further-
more, that opinion clearly indicated that the burden of proving
this family hostility would be on the taxpayer. 55 Haft Trust, how-
ever, left unanswered the question of who the disputing parties
must be. Presumably this question will be answered by requiring
a direct dispute between the parties whose stock is being redeemed
or a controversy between a party who holds a beneficial owner-
ship in the entity whose stock is being redeemed and the other
stockholders of the entity. This requirement did not exist in Haft
Trust, however, and further judicial interpretation of the issue
will be necessary.
The policy recommendation goes further than Haft Trust be-
cause it allows a waiver of all the attribution rules where the
showing of family hostility has been made. If legitimate dishar-
mony exists, it would appear irrelevant whether the stock is owned
by individuals or entities. Of course, the court should review
closely the situation where an individual whose stock is being re-
deemed is benefited by or controls an entity which is remaining a
stockholder. Courts should also consider whether such an indi-
vidual recently created the entity for the benefit of family mem-
bers. This type of inquiry would provide a mechanism to prevent
tax abuse under the suggested policy.





Under the policy recommendation, the taxpayer would still
need to meet the meaningful reduction test of Davis156 to qualify
for favorable redemption treatment. This standard is needed to
prevent the abuses which may occur where a taxpayer redeems a
small percentage of the stock and claims that the family hostility
rule applies, but still exercises significant control over the affairs of
the corporation through his or her remaining stock ownership. 157
Where all the stock of the taxpayer has been redeemed, this provi-
sion should not create any difficulty.
Further support for the policy change is found in the nature of
the closely held corporation. Normally, such an entity is owned
and controlled by a few individuals who all belong to one or two
family units. In most cases the imposition of nonfamily owner-
ship would be an unwelcome and unacceptable solution to a fam-
ily dispute. In such circumstances, a sale of stock back to the
corporation may be the only effective means for the disputing
party to terminate ownership interest in the corporation.158 The
effect of the current redemption rules is to create a disincentive to
the only practical solution to the problem. This result undoubt-
edly has the effect of prolonging many disputes and increasing the
bitterness and animosity involved.
Potential Supreme Court acceptance of these policy guidelines
has been foreshadowed by its decision in Trammel v. United
States. 59 In Trammel the Supreme Court modified the long-
standing common law rule barring the testimony of one spouse
against the other in a criminal proceeding unless both consent.
The Court substituted a guideline that the'witness spouse alone
has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely, and thus may be
neither compelled nor foreclosed from testifying. The Court
noted that the modern justification for the privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering the har-
mony and sanctity of the marriage relationship. 160 Nevertheless,
the Court devised a guideline which, in its view, "furthers the im-
portant public interest in marital harmony without unduly bur-
156. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
157. While a detailed discussion of the meaningful reduction test is beyond the scope of
this Article, the key point reviewed is the effect of the redemption of the taxpayer's control
of the corporation. See Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174 (1972) aJ#'d 487
F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 938 (1974), and Rev. RuL 76-364, 1976-2
C.B. 91.
158. See Note, supra note 108, at 393.
159. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
160. Id. at 44.
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dening legitimate law enforcement needs."'' In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted that if one spouse was willing to tes-
tify against the other in a criminal proceeding, then there was little
in the way of family harmony to preserve.' 62
The Court in Trammel was willing to modify a longstanding
evidentiary rule where social policy had changed over time. The
Court recognized the practical aspects of the situation before it.
Similarly, the longstanding attribution rules might be disregarded
if the Court were convinced that its application was irrational be-
cause of social change. The Trammel decision may indicate a
willingness to support a family hostility exception to the attribu-
tion rules. Current evidence of social change which affects the ra-
tionale of the family attribution rules includes the increasingly
high divorce rate and the general trend toward family relation-
ships which are not so intertwined as those in the past. The Tram-
mel decision involves support to those courts which are willing to
follow Haft Trust and Rickey and provides support for the policy
recommendation suggested.
The suggested policy change could be criticized because it
might create less certain tax results and might overburden the
courts with an additional workload. Neither of these contentions,
however, should be allowed to outweigh legitimate policy consid-
erations. After a few court decisions and the issuance of a few
revenue rulings, taxpayers should have a fairly certain idea of
what would qualify under this provision. Additional criticism of
this proposed change may focus on the absence of a waiver of the
family attribution rules because of disharmony under other Code
sections. This fact alone, however, should not be determinative.'63
It must be pointed out that this recommendation has been made
previously in a somewhat different format without success. In
1958, the Commissioner's advisory group recommended that sec-
tion 302 be amended to provide specifically that in determining
whether a redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend, the
attribution rules of section 318 should not be applicable, but the
relationships described therein might be taken into account along
161. Id. at 53.
162. Id. at 52.
163. See Randall & Benson, Family Dissension and the Attribution Rules ofSections 267,




with all other facts and circumstances. 64 This recommendation,
modified to reflect current developments, should be renewed at
this time.
B. Extension of Statutory Waiver to Estates
The second proposed change, the extension of the statutory
waiver to estates, is supported by the nature of the stockholder
involved. By definition, an estate is not created for a tax avoid-
ance purpose. 65 In many instances under current law, the dece-
dent could have redeemed the stock prior to death by merely
waiving the family attribution rules. Nevertheless, the event of
the stockholder's death prohibits the estate, which is merely a le-
gal extension of the stockholder's existence, from obtaining these
benefits. The effect of the current statutory rules is to thwart a
capital gains redemption because of the unplanned event of death.
While there are situations where a decedent could not redeem
stock on a capital gains basis prior to death because of the entity
attribution rules, the family circumstances of the stock ownership
have permanently changed upon the death, and there seems to be
little policy justification for preventing a section 302 redemption
at that point.
The Rickey case recognized the special characteristics of es-
tates by allowing the estate to waive the entity attribution rules of
section 318(a)(3). The court was cognizant of the status of an es-
tate as an extension of the individual and placed particular reli-
ance on the termination of the estate's actual stock ownership. 166
While the Rickey court may have overstepped the current lan-
guage, the decision appears sound from a policy standpoint. 167 A
legislative change to reflect its rationale is a desirable step.
Congress has partially reacted to this problem by enacting sec-
tion 303.168 This provision allows estates to redeem stock in cor-
porations under the sale or exchange rules to obtain the funds to
pay estate and inheritance taxes and funeral and administrative
expenses. To qualify under section 303, the value of stock owned
by the estate must be greater than fifty percent of the decedent's
adjusted gross estate. Furthermore, the amount which can be re-
164. SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP, REV. REP. ON CORP. DISTRIBUTIONS & AD-
JUSTMENTS P5 (1958).
165. A probate estate is created only on the death of an individual.
166. 592 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir. 1979).
167. Id.
168. I.R.C. § 303.
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deemed is limited to the sum of the taxes and funeral and admin-
istrative costs. The attribution rules are not applied to this type of
redemption. The limitations of section 303 leave substantial gaps
which should be filled by the recommended changes to section
302.
The proposed change regarding estates is in accordance with
reality in many situations. Often the estate needs to obtain funds
to pay administrative expenses, taxes, and perhaps debts of the
decedent. If the guidelines of section 303 cannot be met, the estate
is faced with the dilemma of redeeming the stock at dividend rates
or selling the stock at what may be a depressed price. Further-
more, the estate may be obligated under a buy-sell agreement to
sell the decedent's stock to the corporation at a prearranged price.
Such an arrangement is common in most closely held businesses
to insure that stock ownership is not transferred to nonfamily
owners. This situation occurred in Rickey, and undoubtedly the
court was influenced in its decision by the obligations on the estate
to make the redemption.69
No change is suggested to the current statutory waiver rules
for individuals and other entities. These rules provide a reason-
able guideline to taxpayers that has proved workable. As noted
earlier, the Service has recently issued favorable rulings which ex-
tend these guidelines. 170 This recommendation of the status quo,
however, is conditional on further judicial acceptance of the prin-
ciples of Johnson Trust which allowed trusts to waive the family
attribution rules. 171 There appears to be no logical policy reason
for not allowing entities to take advantage of these statutory
guidelines if they fulfill the other requirements, particularly the
ten-year prior transfer rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of the interplay of the stock attribution rules of sec-
tion 318 with corporate redemptions under section 302 remains a
thorny one. At the present time, case law does not present a fully
developed response to the issue. The Service has taken a position
clearly opposed to the judicial trend in the area, although the
Metzger Trust decision may signal a change in the direction of the
trend. Therefore, the issue awaits further legislative and judicial
169. 592 F.2d at 1258.
170. See note 36 supra.
171. 71 T.C. at 954-55.
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thinking. From a policy standpoint, however, the rationale be-
hind the Haft Trust and Rickey decisions should be accepted as
the guidelines for future developments. The proposals for policy
changes set forth in this Article are based on these cases and pre-
sent a fair and equitable solution to this problem. 172
172. See notes 132-36 supra and accompanying text.
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